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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001690

SIPDIS

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DEPARTMENT FOR AS A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [MARR](#) [AU](#) [UN](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: ACTING FM KARTI ON GUANTANAMO, DARFUR, AND CPA

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (C) Summary: Charge Fernandez and Pol Chief met October 27 with acting Foreign Minister Ali Karti. Regarding the Sudanese detainees in Guantanamo, the Charge encouraged the Minister to accept the text of the certification in order to expedite their return to Sudan as soon as possible. On Darfur, the Charge thanked Karti for approving the US Air Force flights into Darfur for the deployment of the Rwandan AMIS battalions and encouraged the Sudanese to quantify what actions they have taken to facilitate the deployment of peacekeepers. Regarding the CPA, the Minister accused the US of playing favorites. He characterized the meetings of the GNU Finance Minister in Washington as "very negative." Recent hostile statements against the US by President Al-Bashir in the media suggest a temporary downturn Sudanese-US relations following the visit. End summary.

Guantanamo

12. (C) Charge Fernandez encouraged acting Foreign Minister Karti to accept the document stating conditions for the return of Sudanese detainees at Guantanamo without any changes. Karti stated that there are several legal problems with the document, given Sudanese law, but that he was confident we would be able to reach an agreement on the language. The Charge pointed out that every other country had accepted the language verbatim, and said the chances of getting the Sudanese out of Guantanamo quickly would improve by simply accepting the language. Karti repeated his objection, but following the meeting the Charge reiterated his points to MFA Americas Division Director Bassat al Sanusi, who seemed to take our point without making any commitments. The often caustic Karti noted that "what you are telling us is take it or leave it, which is what the US always says to us."

Darfur

13. (C) The Charge thanked Karti for Sudanese cooperation on flight approvals for the US Air Force C-17s that delivered the Heavy Support Package Rwandan force protection battalion into Darfur beginning October 20. The Charge noted we would also transmit our public thanks to the Defense Ministry. Given the recent reports from the UN stating that the GOS is obstructing the deployment of UNAMID, the Charge encouraged Karti to quantify the assistance that Sudan has provided for UNAMID deployment in terms of visas issued, customs clearances, and troop deployments. Charge Fernandez warned

that the UN could very easily begin to blame the GOS for delays that are related to its own operational shortcomings, and again encouraged the Sudanese to quantify all that it has done to ensure the rapid deployment of UNAMID and to be as transparent as possible.

CPA Implementation

¶4. (C) The Charge said the US is very concerned about the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the apparent break-down of the Assessment and Evaluation Commissions (AEC). Minister Karti claimed this is the first time the NCP and the SPLM are intensively talking about mechanisms of implementation and solving problems. "The agreement is self-sufficient," he said. The charge pointed out that the AEC had deteriorated, noting that the SPLM says everything is bad while the SPLM says everything is perfect and the international community sees things at an impasse. Karti responded that the President had agreed to the schedule outlined in the CPA. He added that the NCP accepts the SPLM's right to change its ministers. (Note: As recently as September, Karti's counterpart, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Al-Samani Al-Wasila, and other officials, insisted that the SPLM could not change its own ministers without President Al-Bashir's permission. This permission was not forthcoming - until this crisis - in the case of Lam Akol, an SPLM renegade.)

¶5. (C) Regarding the charge that the government was blocking the cabinet reshuffle, Karti claimed that President Al-Bashir had been waiting for the SPLM to produce an approved list of Ministers. He blamed the problem on internal SPLA struggles between "those who want separation and those who want unity."

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Karti said First Vice President Kiir should be in Khartoum to implement the CPA instead of spending so much time in Juba. In a huff, he noted that Kiir had spent an entire month in Juba "even though he is VP of the entire country." Going to IGAD and the UN is not working, said Karti. CPA issues need to be solved between the parties. The Charge responded that if one party comes to us saying the agreement is blocked, we become concerned. While the impasse is best resolved by the parties themselves, if it cannot be resolved the international community will focus on it.

¶6. (C) The Charge reminded the Minister that Abyei continues to be a serious issue. The US is concerned that a clash could result from a misunderstanding and the soldiers in the area will start killing each other. All the US wants from this process is an agreement that both parties are comfortable with, said the Charge. At this point Karti became angry and accused the US of playing favorites. Predictably, Karti shifted focus and pointed out that the SPLM is creating a mess with the oil money and cannot account for it properly, while the Sudanese government has an auditor general. "You should visit our auditor and see how professional the operation is," suggested Karti. CDA countered that it is our view that there is fiscal corruption in both North and South.

Negative Feedback on US Visit

¶7. (C) Charge concluded by suggesting that there is a real, although narrow, possibility of improving relations with possible forward movement on the Guantanamo detainees, the terrorist list, and maybe even some sanctions, given the right conditions. The Charge pointed out that Assistant *Secretary Frazer had spoken out against the Darfur Divestment Act in Congress given recent positive steps by the Sudanese in the Darfur peace process. The Minister expressed doubt about the prospects for improved relations, given the recent visit of the Sudanese Finance Minister to the US, who came back with a very negative impression following frank

discussion of the sanctions regime with officials in Washington. He said, "you (the USG) are not able to improve relations, even if you wanted to, because there are powerful forces that will not allow you to do so."

18. (C) Comment: An NCP hardline insider, Karti's inflexible views on the CPA and the AEC are not surprising. More notable is the negative feedback on the GOS Finance Minister's recent visit to Washington. The NCP clearly has the view that the meetings were not productive from their point of view, and as a result may have recently assumed a more hostile attitude than usual toward the US. (Although other officials, like Presidential advisor Mustafa Othman Ismail, have advised us to discount regime rhetoric as "for internal consumption only.") President Al-Bashir has gone out of his way to bash the US in public in recent days, stating that "Sudan doesn't need the US or the World Bank for subsistence" at the opening of a bridge in Khartoum on October 28, and accusing the West of "lacking ethics and morals."

FERNANDEZ